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For decades, scientists have conducted hundreds of laboratory 
experiments examining whether deception can be detected from 
behavioral indicators (for reviews, see Masip, 2017; Nortje & 
Tredoux, 2019; Vrij, 2008). Two main conclusions of this research 
are that behavioral indicators are barely related to truthfulness 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007), and that 
humans are poor lie detectors. Indeed, a major meta-analysis 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006) revealed that veracity judgments were 
correct just 54% of the time (compared to 50% chance accuracy 
and 100% perfect accuracy).
Yet, it has been argued that laboratory experiments fail to 
mirror real-life lie-detection circumstances (e.g., Levine, 2018). 
In the laboratory, observers are requested to judge the veracity 
of video-recorded, audio-recorded, or written statements of 
unacquainted senders, and to do so immediately. Under these 
circumstances, the only information available to observers is the 
senders’ verbal and nonverbal behavior. Conversely, in real life, 
deception targets might know the senders and do not need to make 
an immediate judgment. They can question the senders, learn 
about their possible motives to deceive, ask informants, and can 
otherwise search for evidence confi rming or refuting the senders’ 
statements. In everyday situations, present a suspicion of deceit (as 
is typically the case in laboratory experiments because participants 
are explicitly asked to judge veracity), access to information other 
than fallible behavioral cues can increase accuracy. 
Indeed, in a seminal study, Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, 
and Ferrara (2002) asked students to recall a lie they had detected 
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Abstract Resumen
Background: Research shows that people believe deception can be 
detected from behavioral cues despite their past experience of detecting 
lies from non-behavioral, contextual information (evidence, third-person 
reports, etc.). However, in previous research, the question about beliefs 
was necessarily general, while the question about revealing information 
was always about a specifi c lie. In this study, we addressed this problem. 
Method: Participants fi rst indicated how they believed lies can be 
detected (beliefs; Questionnaire 1 or Q1). Next, they described either 
how they, in their past, detected a specifi c lie, several lies, or how they, 
in general, detect lies in their everyday lives (revealing information; Q2). 
Results: Regardless of the focus of Q2, and in line with prior research, 
behavioral cues were reported less often, and contextual indicators more 
often, in responding to Q2 than in responding to Q1. However, contrary to 
prior fi ndings, behavioral cues still predominated in the responses to Q2. 
Conclusions: We found no evidence that the specifi c-vs.-general focus of 
the questions changed the pattern of results, which apparently depended 
solely on whether participants reported beliefs or revealing information. 
We provide explanations for the prevalence of behavioral cues in Q2 
responses, and make suggestions for future research.
Keywords: Deception detection; deception cues; beliefs; contextual 
information; everyday life.
¿La gente detecta las mentiras tal como cree que lo hace? Replicación y 
ampliaciones. Antecedentes: la investigación muestra que las personas 
creen que la mentira se detecta a partir de claves conductuales pese a 
haber detectado mentiras en el pasado a partir de información contextual 
(evidencias, información de terceros...). En dicha investigación previa, 
la pregunta sobre creencias ha sido general, mientras que la referente a 
información reveladora ha sido sobre una mentira concreta. Este estudio 
resuelve este problema. Método: los participantes indicaron cómo 
creían que se pueden detectar mentiras (creencias; Cuestionario 1 o C1). 
Luego describieron cómo, en el pasado, habían descubierto una mentira, 
varias mentiras, o cómo, en general, suelen detectar mentiras en su vida 
cotidiana (información reveladora; C2). Resultados: independientemente 
de la modalidad de C2, y en línea con la investigación previa, las claves 
conductuales se mencionaron menos, y los indicadores contextuales más, 
al responder a C2 que a C1. Sin embargo, se mencionaron más indicios 
conductuales que contextuales incluso en C2. Conclusiones: no hallamos 
evidencia de que el foco específi co o general de las preguntas cambiara el 
patrón de resultados, que al parecer dependió solo de si se mencionaban 
creencias o información reveladora. Ofrecemos explicaciones para la 
prevalencia de claves conductuales en C2 y hacemos sugerencias para la 
investigación futura.
Palabras clave: detección de mentira; claves del engaño; creencias; 
información contextual; vida cotidiana.
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in the past and to indicate how they detected it. Results showed 
that, typically, in everyday life, lies are discovered long after being 
told, and are not detected from behavioral cues but from non-
behavioral, contextual information, such as third-person reports, 
tangible evidence, the liars’ confession, or inconsistencies between 
the lie and the detector’s knowledge. Contextual information either 
reveals deception or can be used to compare the senders’ messages 
to assess their veracity (see Blair, Levine, Reimer, & McCluskey, 
2012). This latter strategy has been called content in context by 
Blair, Levine, and Shaw (2010; see also Levine, 2020), and is 
analogous to Stiff et al.’s (1989) situational familiarity hypothesis, 
which states that contextual knowledge allows lie detectors to 
“visualize” the situation and then judge the plausibility of the 
message (for empirical tests, see Reinhard, Sporer, Scharmach, 
& Marksteiner, 2011). Indeed, there is evidence that access to 
contextual information actually increases the accuracy of veracity 
judgments relative to behavioral cues (Blair et al., 2010; Blair, 
Reimer, & Levine, 2018; Bond, Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 
2013).
The preponderance of contextual information in signaling 
deception in real-life contexts fi rst reported by Park et al. (2002) 
has been confi rmed by subsequent research (Masip & Herrero, 
2015; Novotny et al., 2018; for a meta-analytical integration, see 
Masip & Sánchez, 2019). Both this preponderance and meta-
analytical fi ndings showing that behavior is barely related to 
veracity (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007; 
see also Luke, 2019) are at odds with the strong popular belief that 
honesty is revealed through behavioral cues (e.g., Global Deception 
Research Team, 2006). Before asking respondents to indicate how 
they had detected a lie in the past (revealing information), Masip 
and Herrero (2015) asked them the open question how they believed 
lies can be detected (beliefs). While revealing information was 
mostly contextual (rather than behavioral), believed deception cues 
were mostly behavioral. In other words, the allure of behavioral 
cues as indicators of deception is so strong that it is immune to the 
individual’s personal experience that everyday lies are detected 
mostly from contextual information rather than from behavioral 
cues. 
A limitation of Masip and Herrero’s (2015) study is that while 
the question about beliefs (“Please indicate how you believe 
lies can be detected”) was general, the question about revealing 
information was about a specifi c lie. This raises the question 
whether differences are a result of asking about beliefs versus 
revealing information, or a result of asking a general, abstract 
question versus a question focused on a specifi c lie. In the current 
study, we addressed this issue. We used the same procedure as 
Masip and Herrero (2015), except that we manipulated the focus 
of the revealing-information question. Specifi cally, we asked 
participants to report either (a) how they detected a specifi c lie, 
(b) how they detected several lies, or (c) how they, in general, 
detect lies in everyday life. The specifi c-lie question was the same 
used by Masip and Herrero; therefore, we expected to replicate 
their fi ndings. For the several-lies condition, we also expected to 
replicate Masip and Herrero’s outcomes, thus showing that these 
outcomes were not caused by the specifi c versus general focus 
of the question, but by whether participants reported revealing 
information or beliefs. Finally, for the “general” condition, the 
prediction was less clear; while the question was indeed further 
removed from a specifi c deception instance, it considerably 
overlapped with the question about beliefs. 
An additional goal of this research was to examine whether 
Masip and Herrero’s (2015) fi ndings (obtained with middle-aged, 
mostly [77%] male, community members and police offi cers) could 
be replicated with a different sample of participants (younger, 
mostly female, college students).
Method
Participants
Seventy college students (70% females; M 
age
 = 19.60, SD = 
2.00) volunteered to participate in exchange for an academic 
incentive. They were criminology (66%) and psychology (34%) 
students. None of them had still taken the specifi c courses where 
lie detection is covered.
Instruments
Questionnaire 1 (Q1) was to collect information about beliefs. 
After some short demographic questions, it contained the open 
prompt “Please indicate how you believe lies can be detected.” 
Questionnaire 2 (Q2) focused on revealing information. It 
had three versions. The specifi c-lie-condition version asked 
participants to think of a lie they had detected in the past and then, 
with this in mind, to describe in detail how they detected the lie. 
The several-lies-condition version asked participants to think of 
several situations in which they had detected a lie and then, with 
this in mind, to describe in detail how they detected these lies. The 
general-condition version asked participants to think about how, 
in general, they discover lies in their everyday lives; it explicitly 
asked participants not to think of a specifi c instance of deception, 
but in general terms. Then, with this in mind, participants had 
to describe in detail how they normally detect lies. Both Q1 and 
Q2 had a box where each individual participant wrote a word 
or number of their choice; this was to allow us to put together 
the two questionnaires of each individual while preserving the 
participants’ anonymity. 
Procedure
Data collection. The study was conducted in accordance with 
national and international ethical regulations. The data were collected 
in the context of a practical lecture. The students sat apart from each 
other and were invited to participate. After signing an informed-
consent form, they were instructed not to talk to their peers until the 
end of the session, and were given Q1. After they all had fi nished, Q1 
was collected and Q2 was handed out. The three versions of Q2 were 
alternated. After all the participants had fi nished, we collected Q2, 
thanked the participants and debriefed them.
Coding. Two naïve research assistants were instructed to 
code the participants’ answers using a slightly modifi ed version 
of Masip and Herrero’s (2015) coding scheme. The coding 
scheme differentiated between several kinds of behavioral cues 
(visible, verbal, paralinguistic, physiological, and unspecifi ed-
behavioral), contextual information (third-person information, 
evidence, confession, inconsistency with knowledge, and other-
contextual), and the residual other information category. We 
added an additional contextual category—dispositional honesty/
dishonesty—and slightly improved the defi nitions of some other 
categories. 
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Disagreements between the coders were resolved by discussion. 
The coding categories and reliabilities are displayed in Table 
1. Reliabilities were calculated considering both dichotomous 
data (whether [1] or not [0] a participant mentioned one or more 
indicators pertaining to a specifi c category) and frequencies (the 
number of indicators pertaining to a specifi c category mentioned 
by the participant). Of note, Masip and Herrero (2015) included 
physiological cues (blushing, trembling…) within the behavioral-
cues higher-level category (see Table 1), but after the coding 
for the current study was complete, we noticed that, unlike in 
Masip and Herrero, a number of respondents had mentioned 
psychophysiological measurements (e.g., the polygraph). These 
responses had been assigned by the coders to the physiological-
cues category, but, unlike visible physiological cues, they cannot 
be considered observable behavioral cues—equipment is needed 
to measure them. Therefore, we asked two additional naïve coders 
to re-code responses fi rst placed in the physiological category as 
either visible cues (e.g., blushing, trembling…) or as physiological 
measurements (e.g., polygraph examination). The latter category 
was considered as a separate higher-level category besides 
behavioral cues and contextual information (see Table 2).
Table 1 shows that reliability was very high, except for the 
residual category other-contextual (which had few cases), and for 
inconsistency with knowledge. For the two higher-level categories 
of interest (behavioral cues and contextual information) reliability 
was also very high. Reliability was also good for the re-coding 
of physiological cues as either visible (Kappa = .87, percent 
agreement = 93.61, ICC (2,2) = .94, r = .89) or physiological 
measurements (Kappa = .91, percent agreement = 95.74, ICC (2,2) 
= .96, r = .92).
Data analysis
We conducted a Condition (one lie vs. several lies vs. general) 
× Questionnaire (Q1-beliefs vs. Q2-revealing information) × Type 
of Information (behavioral vs. contextual) test, with repeated 
measures in the latter two variables, on the frequencies for 
behavioral vs. contextual information. We also ran an analogous 
test on the dichotomous data. In line with Masip and Herrero 
(2015), we expected the Questionnaire × Type of Information 
interaction to be signifi cant. Also, if this interaction occurred 
independently of the focus (on a specifi c lie vs. more general) 
of the question used in Q2, the three-way interaction would not 
be signifi cant. Because the distributions seriously violated the 
assumption of normality, we refrained from using an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). Instead, we conducted an ANOVA-type test 
with Noguchi, Gel, Brunner, and Konietschke’s (2012) nparLD 
package for R. 
Noguchi et al.’s (2012) package uses a nonparametric, rank-based 
method to conduct robust, distribution-free tests for main effects 
and interactions in repeated-measure and mixed designs. These 
methods were fi rst developed by Brunner and Puri (2001), and by 
Brunner, Domhof, and Langer (2002), and were incorporated into 
a SAS/IML macro library. nparLD, is an R version of that library 
(Noguchi et al., 2012). It calculates an ANOVA-type statistic (ATS) 
that tests the null hypothesis that the groups being compared have 
identical distributions and the same relative treatment effects (RTEs) 
(Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 2008). RTEs can range between 0 and 
1, and refl ect “the tendency for participants in one group to have 
higher (or lower) scores on the dependent variable, compared with 
the scores of all participants in a study” (Erceg-Hurn & Mirosevich, 
2008, p. 597). In other words, the higher the RTE, the higher the 
probability that a randomly chosen observation from the whole 
dataset has a smaller value than a randomly chosen observation 
from the condition with that RTE (Noguchi et al., 2012). If the null 
hypothesis is true, then all conditions should have RTE = .50; RTEs 
< .05 denote relatively low values in the dependent variable, while 
RTEs > .05 denote relatively high values.
Pairwise comparisons to decompose signifi cant interactions 
were performed with Rogmann’s (2013) orddom R package, 
which calculates Cliff’s (1993, 1996) delta and the corresponding 
Cohen’s (1988) d. Cliffs delta (d) is a statistic that “compares the 
number of times a score from one group or condition is higher 
than one from the other, compared with the reverse” (Cliff, 1993, 
p. 494). It ranges from -1 to +1, and requires no assumptions.
Results
The numbers of participants originally allocated to the 
specifi c-lie, the several-lies, and the general condition were 
23, 24, and 23, respectively. However, it became apparent in 
reading the respondents’ answers that one specifi c-lie participant 
described several lies, and that several participants in the several-
lies condition either described just one lie (n = 4) or explained 
how to detect deception in general (n = 8). After moving these 
participants to the corresponding condition, sample sizes were 
26, 13, and 31 for the specifi c-lie, the several-lies, and the general 
conditions respectively. Neither gender, χ 2 (2) = 1.04, p = .594, phi 
= .122, nor age, F (2, 67) = 0.98, p = .380, η
p
2 = .028, nor academic 
background (criminology vs. psychology), χ 2 (2) = 0.68, p = .711, 
phi = .099, differed signifi cantly across conditions.
Table 2 displays the mean and median frequencies for each 
kind of information, as well as the percentage of participants in 
each condition mentioning each specifi c kind of information. It 
is apparent that the most cited kind of indicator was visible cues, 
followed by verbal cues. Among the contextual information, 
evidence was mentioned most often in all cases except in the 
specifi c-lie condition-Q1 and the general condition-Q2, where 
Table 1
Inter-rater Reliability
 Type of Information





Behavioral Cues .94 99.28 .99 .99
Visible .96 98.57 .99 .97
Verbal .91 95.71 .96 .92
Paralinguistic .92 96.43 .96 .93
Physiological .92 96.43 .98 .96
Unspecifi ed-behavioral .86 92.86 .96 .92
Contextual Information .81 90.72 .96 .93
Third-person information .89 97.86 .96 .92
Evidence .72 90.72 .85 .76
Confession .97 99.28 .98 .97
Inconsistency with knowledge .65 91.43 .58 .41
Dispositional (dis)honesty 1.00 100.00 1.00 1.00
Other-contextual -.02 95.71 -.04 -.02
Other Information .59 97.14 .75 .65
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third-person information and inconsistency with knowledge were, 
respectively, mentioned most often (Table 2).
Frequencies
The ANOVA-type test on frequencies revealed a signifi cant 
main effect for questionnaire, ATS (1) = 9.92, p = .002, indicative 
that fewer indicators were mentioned in responding to Q1 (RTE 
= .48) than in responding to Q2 (RTE = .52). The main effect 
for information type was also signifi cant, ATS (1) = 129.31, p 
< .001; more behavioral cues were mentioned (RTE = .70) than 
contextual indicators (RTE = .30). More interestingly, as predicted, 
the Questionnaire × Information-Type interaction was signifi cant 
(Figure 1a), ATS (1) = 33.50, p < .001, while the three-way 
interaction was not, ATS (1) = 2.68, p = .078. This latter outcome 




Specifi c-lie condition (n = 26) Several-lies condition (n = 13) General condition (n = 31)
Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2
M Mdn % M Mdn % M Mdn % M Mdn % M Mdn % M Mdn %
Behavioral Cues 4.81 4.50 100 3.08 3.00 81 4.69 5.00 100 4.38 3.00 92 4.42 4.00 100 4.48 4.00 94
Visible 2.38 2.00 92 0.96 0.50 50 2.31 3.00 100 1.54 1.00 85 2.35 2.00 97 1.61 1.00 71
Verbal 1.08 1.00 62 0.96 1.00 54 0.92 1.00 62 1.54 1.00 62 0.71 1.00 55 1.32 1.00 77
Paralinguistic 0.42 0.00 31 0.46 0.00 31 0.38 0.00 31 0.54 0.00 38 0.42 0.00 32 0.58 0.00 45
Unspecifi ed-behavioral 0.92 1.00 58 0.69 0.50 50 1.08 1.00 77 0.77 0.00 31 0.94 1.00 58 0.97 1.00 55
Contextual Information 0.31 0.00 19 1.81 2.00 73 0.31 0.00 15 1.85 1.00 69 0.13 0.00 13 0.90 1.00 55
Third-person information 0.12 0.00 12 0.23 0.00 23 0.08 0.00 8 0.38 0.00 23 0.00 0.00 0 0.16 0.00 13
Evidence 0.04 0.00 4 0.77 0.00 46 0.15 0.00 15 0.77 0.00 38 0.13 0.00 13 0.26 0.00 23
Confession 0.04 0.00 4 0.42 0.00 42 0.08 0.00 8 0.23 0.00 23 0.00 0.00 0 0.03 0.00 3
Inconsistency with knowledge 0.04 0.00 4 0.27 0.00 23 0.00 0.00 0 0.31 0.00 31 0.00 0.00 0 0.32 0.00 26
Dispositional (dis)honesty 0.04 0.00 4 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.08 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0 0.03 0.00 3
Other-contextual 0.04 0.00 4 0.12 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0 0.08 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0 0.10 0.00 10
Physiological Measurements 0.62 0.00 42 0.00 0.00 0 0.38 0.00 31 0.00 0.00 0 0.45 0.00 42 0.00 0.00 0
Other Information 0.12 0.00 8 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.06 0.00 6 0.03 0.00 3
TOTAL 5.85 5.00 100 4.88 4.50 100 5.38 6.00 100 6.23 5.00 100 5.06 5.00 100 5.42 5.00 100
Note: M: Mean number of indicators; Mdn: Median number of indicators; %: Percentage of participants mentioning indicators of the specifi c kind
Figure 1. Relative treatment effects (RTEs) for the Questionnaire x Type of Information interaction
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It is unlikely that the non-signifi cance of this interaction was 
caused by insuffi cient power. Sample size was not remarkably 
small and nonparametric tests are generally much more powerful 
than parametric tests (e.g., Brunner et al., 2002; Erceg-Hurn & 
Mirosevich, 2008). In addition, Noguchi et al.’s (2012) ANOVA-
type test “maintains an accurate size of the test even for small 
sample sizes (n ≥ 7)” (Noguchi et al., 2012, p. 8).
Table 3 displays the results of the pairwise comparisons 
decomposing the signifi cant two-way interaction. All comparisons 
were signifi cant, with more behavioral cues being mentioned than 
contextual indicators when the participants were asked about both, 
beliefs (with very large effect sizes) and revealing information (with 
smaller, but still rather large effect sizes). Also, when asked about 
revealing information (Q2), participants mentioned signifi cantly 
fewer behavioral cues and signifi cantly more contextual indicators 
than when they were asked about beliefs (Q1). 
Dichotomous data
The analyses on the dichotomous data yielded similar results. 
Again, the ANOVA-type test revealed signifi cant main effects for 
questionnaire, ATS (1) = 25.36, p < .001 (for Q1, RTE = .45; for Q2, 
RTE = .55), and for information type, ATS (1) = 98.55, p < .001 (for 
behavioral cues, RTE = .64; for contextual information, RTE = .36), 
and a signifi cant Questionnaire x Information Type interaction, 
ATS (1) = 63.76, p < .001 (Figure 1b). The outcomes of pairwise-
comparison tests for this interaction are shown in Table 4. The three-
way interaction was again not signifi cant, ATS (1) = 0.87, p = .416. 
Discussion
Masip and Herrero (2015) found that more respondents 
mentioned behavioral cues, and fewer mentioned contextual 
information, in responding to Q1 (beliefs) than in responding 
to Q2 (revealing information). However, in their study, the Q1 
question was general, while the Q2 question focused on a specifi c 
lie. Therefore, there was a confound between asking about beliefs 
vs. revealing information and the general vs. specifi c focus of the 
questions. We addressed this issue by using three versions of the 
revealing information question; one that asked about a specifi c lie, 
one that asked about several lies, and one that was nearly as general 
as the Q1 question. As expected, our results revealed a decrease 
in both the frequency of behavioral cues and the percentage of 
participants mentioning them in responding to Q2 compared to 
Q1, as well as parallel increases for contextual cues (Figure 1). 
Importantly, we found no evidence that these effects depended on 
the focus of the Q2 question. Thus, it is unlikely that Masip and 
Herrero’s (2015) fi ndings were caused by a difference between the 
focus of the belief question (general) and that of the revealing-
indicators question (specifi c). 
We also examined whether Masip and Herrero’s (2015) 
outcomes were replicated with participants from a different 
population. As expected, the superiority of behavioral cues over 
contextual information when the participants were asked about 
their general beliefs (Q1) was replicated. This outcome can 
be due to behavioral (particularly nonverbal) cues being more 
global in their use (i.e., independent from a specifi c context) than 
contextual indicators, as well as easier to process than other kinds 
of information (see Reinhard & Sporer, 2008, 2010). It can also be 
a result of worldwide socialization practices fostering in children 
the belief that lying elicits negative emotions that are revealed 
through visible behavior (see Global Deception Research Team, 
2006).
As mentioned above, we also replicated Masip and Herrero’s 
(2015) fi nding of a decrease for behavioral cues, and an increase 
for contextual information, in Q2 (relative to Q1). However, unlike 
Masip and Herrero, we found no evidence for the superiority of 
contextual information over behavioral cues in responding to 
Table 3
Pairwise Comparisons for the Questionnaire × Information-Type Interaction with the Frequency Data
Comparison Cliff’s d (95% CI) SD of Cliff’s d Z score p (two tailed) Cohen’s d (95% CI)
 a > b
Within .24 (.02, .46) .11 2.20 .031 0.35 (0.03, 0.77)
Between .17 (.003, .35) .09 2.03 .046 0.24 (0.004, 0.53)
Combined 0.42 (0.04, 0.80) 0.19 2.20 .031 –
 c < d
Within -.59 (-.71, -.46) .06 -9.34 < .001 -0.58 (-0.67, -0.47)
Between -.51 (-.63, -.39) .06 -8.58 < .001 -0.52 (-0.61, -0.41)
Combined -1.10 (-1.33, -0.86) 0.12 -9.34 < .001 –
 a > c
Within 1.00 (.89, 1.00) .00 ∞ < .001 ∞ (2.60, ∞)
Between .98 (.97, .98) .01 123.13 < .001 4.21 (3.68, 5.73)
Combined 1.98 (1.97, 2.00) 0.01 248.52 < .001 –
 b > d
Within .39 (.17, .60) .11 3.56 < .001 0.61 (0.23, 1.14)
Between .57 (.39, .75) .09 6.34 < .001 1.05 (0.62, 1.69)
Combined 0.96 (0.57, 1.35) 0.19 4.91 < .001 –
Note: As shown in Figure 1, a: Beliefs – Behavioral; b: Revealing information – Behavioral; c: Beliefs – Contextual; and d: Revealing information – Contextual. Within: For repeated-measure 
designs, Cliff’s d
w
 is the “difference between the proportion of individual subjects who change in one direction and the proportion of individuals who change in the other” (Cliff, 1996, p. 159). 
Between: For repeated-measure designs, Cliff’s d
b
 is “the extent to which the overall distribution has moved, except for the self-comparisons” (Cliff, 1996, p. 160)
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Q2. On the contrary, we found a signifi cant difference in favor of 
behavioral cues (though this difference was considerably smaller 
than for Q1). This fi nding is remarkable because all prior research 
has found that, when participants are asked how they detected 
lies in the past (revealing information), contextual indicators 
are mentioned more frequently, or by more participants, than 
behavioral cues (Masip & Herrero, 2015; Novotny et al., 2018; 
Park et al., 2002; for an overview, see Masip & Sánchez, 2019). 
There are two factors which, in combination, might have 
been responsible for this unexpected fi nding. First, because most 
participants were criminology students, they might have been 
particularly conscientious in reporting all kinds of deception cues, 
which might have led them to report not only detection indicators, 
but also mere suspicion ones. This is apparent in reading several 
respondents’ answers. Consider this example (Participant 
#007; the surface level details have been edited to maintain the 
individuals’ anonymity, but indicators and strategies have been 
left untouched):
There was that friend who did not want to tell me about her 
visit to the doctor. She told me she did not recall or told me 
about it in a general way. It was like that several times, which 
was surprising to me because in the short term you always 
remember what your doctor told you. One day I decided to ask 
her sister, who told me that my friend was undergoing a number 
of diagnostic tests because they suspected she could be suffering 
from breast cancer. That’s why she refused to give direct answers 
or switched topic every time I asked her. She kept doing this 
for a while, but I was more alert and noticed it, until one day I 
confronted her and she had no option but to acknowledge that 
she had been hiding that information from me. 
Clearly, this response contains several suspicion cues (evasive or 
vague responses given by the friend, the friend switching topic…), 
two strategies to corroborate the suspicion (asking the friend’s 
sister and confronting the friend), and two detection indicators (the 
sister’s information and the friend’s ultimate confession). There 
were several replies similar to this one, as well as many where it 
was uncertain to us whether most indicators where suspicion or 
detection ones. Research has shown that more behavioral cues are 
reported when participants are asked about suspicion indicators 
than when they are asked about detection indicators (Novotny 
et al., 2018; Masip & Sánchez, 2019); therefore, the inclusion of 
numerous indicators of mere suspicion by our participants might 
have increased the number of behavioral cues in Q2. 
This issue underscores the need to conceptually distinguish 
between suspicion indicators, the detector’s strategies (to corroborate 
their suspicion), and detection indicators. Also, researchers should 
explicitly tell participants about the distinction between suspicion 
and detection indicators, so that the participants fully understand 
what specifi c kind of indicators researchers are asking for.
The second reason why, overall, we found that the Q2 responses 
contained more behavioral than contextual indicators lies in the 
general condition’s responses. As noted, the general pattern of 
results was the same across conditions, but the separate effects 
might have been somewhat stronger in certain conditions than 
others. Specifi cally, visual inspection of Table 2 suggests that, 
for the general condition, the decrease for behavioral cues in Q2 
(relative to Q1) was meager. Also, the increase for contextual 
information, though substantial, looks more modest than for 
the other conditions (formal calculations of Cliff’s ds and the 
associated signifi cance levels supported these impressions; these 
analyses are available from the corresponding author on request). 
Thus, even though the Questionnaire × Type of Information 
interaction was still signifi cant considering the general condition 
only (for frequency data, ATS (1) = 5.70, p = .017; for dichotomous 
data, ATS (1) = 18.54, p < .001), the trend for this condition to 
contain some more behavioral cues and fewer contextual indicators 
than the other conditions might have contributed to the signifi cant 
difference in Q2 in favor of behavioral cues. These trends for the 
Table 4
Pairwise Comparisons for the Questionnaire × Information-Type Interaction with the Dichotomous Data
Comparison Cliff’s d (95% CI) SD of Cliff’s d Z score p (two tailed) Cohen’s d (95% CI)
 a > b
Within .11 (.04, .19) .04 2.98 .004 0.15 (0.05, 0.26)
Between .11 (.04, .19) .04 2.98 .004 0.15 (0.05, 0.26)
Combined 0.23 (0.08, 0.38) 0.08 2.98 .004 –
 c < d
Within -.49 (-.61, -.37) .06 -8.07 < .001 -0.49 (-0.59, -0.39)
Between -.49 (-.61, -.37) .06 -8.07 < .001 -0.49 (-0.59, -0.39)
Combined -0.97 (-1.21, -0.73) 0.12 -8.07 < .001 –
 a > c
Within .84 (.76, .93) .04 19.24 < .001 2.20 (1.71, 3.03)
Between .84 (.76, .93) .04 19.24 < .001 2.20 (1.71, 3.03)
Combined 1.69 (1.51, 1.86) 0.09 19.24 < .001 –
 b > d
Within .24 (.09, .40) .08 3.14 .002 0.35 (0.12, 0.63)
Between .24 (.09, .40) .08 3.14 .002 0.35 (0.12, 0.63)
Combined 0.49 (0.18, 0.79) 0.15 3.14 .002 –
Note: As shown in Figure 1, a: Beliefs – Behavioral; b: Revealing information – Behavioral; c: Beliefs – Contextual; and d: Revealing information – Contextual. Within: For repeated-measure 
designs, Cliff’s d
w
 is the “difference between the proportion of individual subjects who change in one direction and the proportion of individuals who change in the other” (Cliff, 1996, p. 159). 
Between: For repeated-measure designs, Cliff’s d
b
 is “the extent to which the overall distribution has moved, except for the self-comparisons” (Cliff, 1996, p. 160)
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general condition might be due to the resemblance between the Q2 
question for this condition and the Q1 question.
Readers may think of a third possible reason why behavioral 
cues were still prevalent over contextual information in the 
responses to Q2: Q1 might have primed participants to think of 
general indicators; in replying to Q2, they might have provided the 
same (or very similar) answers. However, this is unlikely; it should 
be noted that Masip and Herrero (2015) also asked participants 
to report their beliefs fi rst, yet they found the usual prevalence of 
contextual over behavioral cues in responding to Q2. 
There is an additional interesting difference between the 
outcomes of this study and those of Masip and Herrero (2015). 
A substantial proportion of the current participants mentioned 
psychophysiological devices and measures in explaining how 
they believed lies can be detected (Q1). Again, this effect might 
have emerged because most participants were young criminology 
students rather than middle-aged ordinary citizens or seasoned 
local police offi cers. Although none of our participants had taken 
any of the courses in their degrees covering lie detection, they 
presumably had interest in criminalistic issues and watched 
fi ctional TV series displaying the polygraph and more sophisticated 
“high-tech” devices to detect deception. 
To conclude, we compared people’s beliefs about deception 
cues (Q1) with revealing information (Q2). We found a large 
preponderance of behavioral cues when participants reported 
beliefs. When asked about revealing deception indicators, 
the participants mentioned fewer behavioral cues and more 
contextual information than when asked about beliefs. However, 
behavioral cues were also somewhat predominant among the 
reported revealing indicators. This latter fi nding appears to be a 
consequence of our participants having mentioned suspicion cues 
in addition to detection indicators, coupled with a tendency for the 
general condition group to show somewhat more modest changes 
(compared to the other conditions) in Q2 relative to Q1. In any case, 
we found no evidence that the specifi c-vs.-more-general focus of 
the revealing information question had any substantial effect on 
the general pattern of results (i.e., on the meaningful Questionnaire 
× Information Type signifi cant interaction), which replicated 
across conditions. The study also stresses the need to separate 
between deception indicators and lie-detection strategies, as well 
as to distinguish between suspicion and deception indicators. It 
also underscores the need to be clear about the specifi c kind of 
indicator requested from participants. Finally, this study shows 
that different populations can have different views about how lies 
can be detected.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to Borja Martí, Sheila Rodríguez, Mireia 
Sánchez and David Sánchez for their assistance; to Rodrigo 
Carcedo and Emiliano Díez for their suggestions concerning 
data analysis; to Ana Isabel Jiménez for her comments on the 
manuscript, and to Fundación Universitaria Behavior & Law for 
its endorsement of the research proposal.
This research was supported by the Consejería de Educación, 
Junta de Castilla y León (Spain), Subvenciones Destinadas al Apoyo 
de los Grupos de Investigación Reconocidos de Universidades 
Públicas de Castilla y León (Grant Number SA041G19).
References
Blair, J. P., Levine, T. R., & Shaw, A. S. (2010). Content in context improves 
deception detection accuracy. Human Communication Research, 36, 
423-442.
 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2010.01382.x
Blair, J. P., Levine, T. R., Reimer, T. O., & McCluskey, J. D. (2012). The 
gap between reality and research. Another look at detecting deception 
in fi eld settings. Policing: An International Journal, 35, 723-740.
 https://doi.org/10.1108/13639511211275553
Blair, J. P., Reimer, T. O., & Levine, T. R. (2018). The role of consistency 
in detecting deception: The superiority of correspondence over 
coherence. Communication Studies, 69, 483-498.
 https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2018.1447492
Bond, C. F., Jr., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception 
judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214-
234.
 https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_2
Bond, C. F., Jr., Howard, A. R., Hutchison, J. L., & Masip, J. (2013). 
Overlooking the obvious: Incentives to lie. Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology, 35, 212-221.
 https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2013.764302
Brunner, E., Domhof, S., & Langer, F. (2002). Nonparametric analysis of 
longitudinal data in factorial experiments. New York: Wiley.
Brunner, E., & Puri, M. L. (2001). Nonparametric methods in factorial 
designs. Statistical Papers, 42, 1-52.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003620000039
Cliff, N. (1993). Dominance statistics: Ordinal analyses to answer ordinal 
questions. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 494-509.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.114.3.494
Cliff, N. (1996). Ordinal methods for behavioral data analysis. Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. 
New York, NY: Academic Press.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L., Charlton, 
K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 
129, 74-118.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.1.74
Erceg-Hurn, D. M., & Mirosevich, V. M. (2008). Modern robust statistical 
methods. An easy way to maximize the accuracy and power of your 
research. American Psychologist, 63, 591-601.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.7.591
Global Deception Research Team (2006). A world of lies. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37, 60-74.
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022105282295
Levine, T. R. (2018). Ecological validity and deception detection research 
design. Communication Methods and Measures, 12, 45-54.
 https://doi.org/10.1080/19312458.2017.1411471
Levine, T. R. (2020). Duped. Truth-default theory and the social science 
of lying and deception. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama 
Press.
Luke, T. J. (2019). Lessons from Pinocchio: Cues to deception may be 
highly exaggerated. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 14, 646-
671.
 https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619838258
Masip, J. (2017). Deception detection: State of the art and future prospects. 
Psicothema, 29, 149-159.
 https://doi.org/10.7334/psicothema2017.34
Masip, J., & Herrero, C. (2015). Police detection of deception: Beliefs 
about behavioral cues to deception are strong even though contextual 
evidence is more useful. Journal of Communication, 65, 125-145.
 https://doi.org/10.1111/jcom.12135
Nuria Sánchez and Jaume Masip
336
Masip, J., & Sánchez, N. (2019). How people really suspect lies: A 
re-examination of Novotny et al.’s (2018) data. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 43, 481-492.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-019-00309-y
Noguchi, K., Gel, Y. R., Brunner, E., & Konietschke, F. (2012). nparLD: 
An R software package for the nonparametric analysis of longitudinal 
data in factorial experiments. Journal of Statistical Software, 50(12), 
1-23.
Nortje, A., & Tredoux, C. (2019). How good are we at detecting deception? 
A review of current techniques and theories. South African Journal of 
Psychology, 49, 491-504.
 https://doi.org/10.1177/0081246318822953
Novotny, E., Carr, Z., Frank, M. G., Dietrich, S. B., Shaddock, T., Cardwell, 
M., & Decker, A. (2018). How people really suspect and discover lies. 
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 42, 41-52.
 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10919-017-0263-2
Park, H. S., Levine, T. R., McCornack, S. A., Morrison, K., & Ferrara, S. 
(2002). How people really detect lies. Communication Monographs, 
69, 144-157.
 https://doi.org/10.1080/714041710
Reinhard, M.-A., & Sporer, S. L. (2008). Verbal and nonverbal behavior 
as a basis for credibility attribution: The impact of task involvement 
and cognitive capacity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
44, 477-488.
 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2007.07.012
Reinhard, M.-A., & Sporer, S. L. (2010). Content versus source cue 
information as a basis for credibility judgments: The impact of task 
involvement. Social Psychology, 41, 93-104.
 https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000014
Reinhard, M.-A., Sporer, S. L., Scharmach, M., & Marksteiner, T. (2011) 
Listening, not watching: Situational familiarity and the ability to 
detect deception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101, 
467-484.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023726
Rogmann, J. (2013). orddom: Ordinal dominance statistics. R package. 
Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/orddom/
Sporer, S. L., & Schwandt, B. (2006). Paraverbal indicators of deception: A 
meta-analytic synthesis. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20, 421-446.
 https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.1190
Sporer, S. L., & Schwandt, B. (2007). Moderators of nonverbal indicators 
of deception: A meta-analytic synthesis. Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law, 13, 1-34.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/1076-8971.13.1.1
Stiff, J. B., Miller, G. R., Sleight, C., Mongeau, P., Garlick, R., & Rogan, R. 
(1989). Explanations for visual cue primacy in judgments of honesty 
and deceit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 555-
564.
 https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.56.4.555
Vrij, A. (2008). Detecting lies and deceit: Pitfalls and opportunities. 
Chichester, UK: Wiley.
